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tended in the Offerman case that the evidence of the conversation
between the two officers was necessary to show how the tests were
performed, and not to prove that the same speeds were registered by
each of the two devices. The witnesses' independent testimony as to
what they actually observed could be used to prove the speeds as in-
dicated by the speed meter and the speedometer.
North Carolina has still another basis upon which such evidence
could be admitted. The peculiar rule in North Carolina which permits
a corroborating witness to relate past conversations with the first testi-
fying witness would allow this type of evidence, if used for corrobora-
tion only and not as evidence of the truth of the matter asserted. 15
Each officer could "corroborate" the other as to the conversation be-
tween the two. As this peculiar rule is already overworked and has
been criticized,1 6 this method of getting the evidence before the court
is not recommended.
While there have been no reported decisions in North Carolina con-
cerning the admissibility of evidence obtained by use of the "whammy,"
there is no reason why such evidence should not be admitted if it
is properly presented. To prevent any possible contention that the
evidence of the radar-patrol car team is hearsay, it is suggested that
the procedure by which the evidence was presented in the Dantonio
case be followed.
MICHAEL P. MCLEOD.
Federal jurisdiction-The Sovereign Immunity Doctrine-Actions
Against Federal Officials-Equitable Relief and Mandamus
The doctrine of the sovereign's immunity from suit has been a part
of our jurisprudence at least since the days of Edward I of England.'
It is elementary that the sovereign is not amenable to suit in his courts
unless he has consented to be sued. Amendment XI of the Consti-
tution of the United States expressly grants to states in the union im-
munity from suits brought in the federal courts by citizens of other
states or .by citizens or subjects of any foreign state;2 however, the
doctrine of the immunity of the federal government from suit is judge-
made.
3
" Burnett v. Wilmington, New Bern and Norfolk Ry., 120 N. C. 517, 26 S. E.
819 (1896).
1" State v. Parrish, 79 N. C. 610 (1878).
1 United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 205 (1882).
2By judicial construction, the Amendment extends to suits against a state
brought by a citizen of that state. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890).
Furthermore, foreign states cannot sue one of the United States without its
consent. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313 (1934).
'Justice Frankfurter has said, "As to the states, legal irresponsibility was
written into the Constitution by the Eleventh Amendment; as to the United
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The United States cannot be sued without its consent, and any
person who seeks to assert a claim against the United States can do
so only within the limits of federal statutes granting jurisdiction of
suits against the United States to the district courts and the Court
of Claims.4 Although the federal government has consented to be
sued for damages in actions involving contracts, it has long been estab-
lished that the United States has not consented to suits for specific
performance of contracts to which it is a party.5 With certain enum-
erated exceptions, the federal government is now subject to suit in
tort for damages inflicted by its agents,6 but no statute consents to suits
States, it is derived by implication." Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 708 (1949).
The legal issues involved are the same whether a state or a federal of-
ficial is involved, and the same rules are applied to determine if a suit against
an official of either government is in reality a suit against the government
which employs him, a suit which cannot be maintained absent consent of that
government. Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47 (1944); In
re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443 (1887).
The suability of a governmental corporation depends upon the terms of the
statute creating it. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U. S.
381 (1939).
If the defendant is a governmental agency, the tests to be applied to de-
termine if the action is in effect one against the sovereign without its consent
are the same as with individual defendant officials. Reconstruction Finance
Corp. v. MacArthur Mining Co., Inc., 184 F. 2d 913 (8th Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U. S. 943 (1951).
'The Court of Claims, established in 1855, has jurisdiction over claims
against the United States founded upon the Constitution, any Act of Congress,
any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied con-
tract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in
cases not sounding in tort. 28 U. S. C. § 1491 et seq. (1952). The Court of
Claims has appellate jurisdiction of final judgments of the district courts arising
under the Tort Claims Act, if all of the appellees consent. 28 U. S. C. § 1504
(1952).
The district courts have original jurisdiction of petitions for partition of
lands wherein the United States has an interest as tenant in common or as
joint tenant. 28 U. S. C. § 1347 (1948). Since 1946 the district courts have
had exclusive jurisdiction of tort claims against the United States. 28 U. S. C.
§ 1346(b) (1952). Since 1887 the district courts have had original jurisdiction,
concurrent with the Court of Claims, of claims not exceeding $10,000 founded
upon the Constitution, any Act of Congress, an executive department regula-
tion, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for
liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort. 28 U. S. C.
§ 1346(a) (2) (1952).
'United States v. Jones, 131 U. S. 1 (1888) (Although the plaintiff's claim
may be based on some equitable interest or on equitable grounds, money dam-
ages only are allowed under what is now 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a) (1952) and 28
U. S. C. § 1491 (1952).)
The United States does not waive its immunity by instituting an action
against those who seek to, assert a counterclaim against it which could not
have been asserted in an original action, if that counterclaim would not be a
defense against the original action as between private litigants. United States v.
Patterson, 206 F. 2d 345 (5th Cir. 1953).
828 U. S. C. § 1346(b) (1952). Customs officers are answerable personally
for their torts. 28 U. S. C. § 2680(c) (1952) ; Nakasheff v. Continental Ins.
Co., 89 F. Supp. 87 (S. D. N. Y. 1950).
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in equity against the United States for relief controlling the tortious
activity.
Undoubtedly it is this unavailability of specific performance against
the United States and the freedom of the sovereign from equitable
decrees curbing tortious activity which have given rise to the complex
development of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in suits against
federal officials. Courts of equity generally allow specific relief between
private parties whenever money damages are inadequate or the plain-
tiff makes a showing of need; in many situations such relief is also
desirable in suits against the United States, but the only possible way
to obtain it is to seek a decree against the individual officials in-
volved.
If the court holds that the suit is in *effect one against the federal
government, it must dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. This
is illustrated in the leading case of Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com-
merce Corp.7 In this case the plaintiff contracted with the Regional
Director of the War Assets Administration to buy surplus coal. The
plaintiff arranged an irrevocable letter of credit payable to the War
Assets Administration in spite of the Regional Director's insistence
that under the terms of the contract the plaintiff was to deposit cash
with a named bank. The Director cancelled the contract and arranged
to sell the coal to another party. The plaintiff proceeded against the
War Assets Administrator, contending that title to the coal had passed
to it, that the defendant was acting "illegally," and that his refusal
to effect a delivery of the coal was "unauthorized," and prayed that the
defendant be enjoined from selling or delivering the coal to anyone
other than the plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff
was asking relief against the United States, for the reason that the
Regional Director had authority to construe the sales contract whether
or not he had actually made an error in construction, and that the
complaint must therefore be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The significance of this and other cases dealing with suits against
federal officials can be more readily ascertained by dividing the sub-
ject matter into several categories.
1. Suits involving official action in excess of valid authority or pur-
suant to invalid authority. An official's actions are his individual acts
and not those of the sovereign if he acts in excess of or without authori-
ty, or if the grant of authority itself is unconstitutional,8 and he may be
sued.9 The language of the court in the Domestic & Foreign case re-
7 337 U. S. 682 (1949).' Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 620 (1912); Ex parte Young,
209 U. S. 123 (1908) (state official).
'Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952); joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 (1951); Lincoln
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affirmed this rule and emphasized that a mere showing that the de-
fendant official made an error in the interpretation or application of
his authority did not meet the requirements for jurisdiction.10 Even
when it was contended that the officer had made an error so gross as
to amount to total lack of authority, the rule has been applied."
2. Suits to prevent wrongful withholding or unconstitutional taking
of plaintiff's property. Many cases proceed upon the basis of the right
under general law to recover specific property wrongfully withheld.'
2
Several early cases allowed suits for specific relief against federal of-
ficers to prevent a wrongful taking without careful examination of
whether the officials were acting for the United States pursuant to
authority granted or were acting only as individuals. 13 In Land v.
Dollar,'4 decided shortly before Domestic & Foreign, the Maritime
Commission contracted with stockholders in a financially weak cor-
poration to grant it an operating subsidy, release certain obligations,
loan it money, and procure a loan for it from the Reconstruction Fi-
nance Corporation, all for a delivery of the stockholders' shares in-
dorsed in blank to the Commission. When the debtor corporation's
Electric Co. v. Forrestal, 334 U. S. 841 (1948); Mine Safety Appliances Co.
v. Forrestal, 326 U. S. 371 (1945); Work v. Louisiana, 269 U. S. 250 (1925) ;
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605 (1912) ; Harper v. Jones, 195 F. 2d
705 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U. S. 821 (1952); Noce v. Edward E. Morgan
Co., Inc., 106 F. 2d 746 (8th Cir. 1939); Ferris v. Wilbur, 27 F. 2d 262 (4th
Cir. 1928).
0 "Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 695 (1949).
The Court rejected the contention that an officer given the power to make de-
cisions is authorized only to decide correctly. Id. at 695. This strict rule is a
departure from earlier cases. Payne v. Central Pacific R. R., 255 U. S. 228
(1921).
R' ogers v. Skinner, 201 F. 2d 521 (5th Cir. 1953) ; American Dredging Co.
v. Cochrane, 190 F. 2d 106 (D. C. Cir. 1951); Metropolitan Training Center v.
Gray, 188 F. 2d 28 (D. C. Cir. 1951); Fay v. Miller, 183 F. 2d 986 (D. C.
Cir. 1950). Contra: Farrell v. Moomau, 85 F. Supp. 125 (N. D. Cal. 1949)
(court decided that officials did not strictly adhere to provisions of the Veteran's
Preference Act of 1944 in discharging the plaintiff, thereby acting in excess
of statutory authority, and distinguished the Domestic & Foreign decision as
dependent upon the sovereign property therein involved).
2 Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731 (1947).
" Ickes v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82 (1937) (wrongful invasion of property rights
is enjoinable); Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U. S. 536 (1926) (wrongful trespass
against personal property is enjoinable) ; Lane v. Watts, 235 U. S. 525 (1913)
(plaintiff can restrain Secretary of Interior and subordinates from acts which
would cast a cloud upon plaintiff's title, even though such acts were under color
of office) ; United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 (1882) (officials can be ejected
from plaintiff's land to prevent an unconstitutional taking). Cf. Perkins v.
Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 112 (1940) (Court found that defendant acted
pursuant to valid authority and rejected plaintiff's contention that there was
a tortious invasion of private rights); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S.
605 (1912) (courts have jurisdiction of actions to prevent wrongful invasions
of property rights, but plaintiff loses on the merits if official was acting pursuant
to a valid grant of authority); Naganab v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 473 (1906)
(contention rejected that sale of Indian lands pursuant to Act of Congress would
be an unconstitutional taking from the tribe).
1'330 U. S. 731 (1947).
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successor corporation had fully paid all its debts to the United States
the members of the Maritime Commission refused to return the shares,
contending that the stock had been transferred outright, not pledged
as collateral.' 5 The stockholders instituted proceedings against the
members of the Commission to compel return of the stock, alleging
that it had been merely pledged and that the defendants were unlaw-
fully in possession and wrongfully withholding the shares, or, even if
the stock had been transferred outright, the defendants were exceeding
their authority 16 which allowed the Commission to receive only property
pledged as collateral. The Supreme Court held that if the shares were
pledged the defendants could be sued to compel a return to the right-
ful owners; therefore, since the jurisdictional issue depended upon a
decision on the merits, the district court had jurisdiction to determine
its jurisdiction. Subsequently the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia decided that there had been only a pledge of the shares
and granted coercive relief to compel their return.
17
After stating that the two major categories of cases where there
will be jurisdiction are (a) where the officer acts in excess of his
authority and (b) where his authority is unconstitutional, the Domes-
tic & Foreign opinion emphatically rejects the contention that there
is a third category in which official action may be directed or re-
strained-the category of cases which proceeds upon the theory that
the official is "wrongfully" or "illegally" withholding the property of
the plaintiff.'8 The Court states that such a theory is erroneous in
that it confuses the doctrine of sovereign immunity with the require-
ment that a plaintiff state a cause of action.19 The argument that
the sovereign cannot authorize the commission of a tort is also rejected
as the Court points out that under agency law the fact that the agent
acts tortiously does not mean that ipso facto he has exceeded his author-
ity, to the extent that he would be acting for himself alone and not
for his principal. 20 The Court uses broad language to the effect that
specific relief compelling the return of property tortiously taken or
withheld cannot be had against a government officer unless his acts
conflict with the terms of a valid grant of authority and would not be
"Subsequently, the members of the Commission voted the stock at the cor-
poration's annual meeting and participated in the conduct of corporate affairs.
Land v. Dollar, 190 F. 2d 366, 369 (D. C. Cir. 1951).
'-49 STAT. § 1988 (1936), as amended, 46 U. S. C. § 1117 (1952).
1 T Dollar v. Land, 184 F. 2d 245 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 884
(1950). For subsequent developments in the Dollar litigation see Land v. Dollar,
190 F. 2d 366 (D. C. Cir. 1951) ; Sawyer v. Dollar, 190 F. 2d 623 (D. C. Cir.
1951); United States v. Dollar, 188 F. 2d 629 (D. C. Cir. 1951); Sawyer v.
Dollar, 344 U. S. 806 (1952) (dismissed as molot).
" Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 692 (1949).




regarded under the law of agency as the actions of the principal.21 A
government, like a corporation, can act only through its agents; there-
fore, to hold that an action will be entertained against an official who
is acting within the scope of his authority for and on behalf of the
sovereign merely because the officer is withholding property "wrong-
fully" would amount to a rejection of the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity. The Court distinguished earlier cases which ostensibly al-
lowed tortious withholding of property as being hinged upon uncon-
stitutional action or lack of authority.
22
The language used in Domestic & Foreign would seem to be a
repudiation of all that Land v. Dollar stands for, but the Court did
not overrule the latter case. The Court explained the case 23 on which
Land v. Dollar principally relied as one involving an unconstitutional
taking of property, and stated that Land v. Dollar itself proceeded upon
allegations in the complaint that the members of the Maritime Com-
mission were acting without authority.24 The two cases cannot easily
be reconciled. Jurisdiction of the action against the members of the
Maritime Commission was entertained even though the shares of stock
were only pledged, which was exactly the security transaction allowed
by the statute.2 If the Commissioners in Land v. Dollar had received
an outright transfer of the shares, then their acts would have conflicted
with their statutory authority. If the Domestic & Foreign majority
meant by their explanation 26 of Land v. Dollar that jurisdiction there
depended upon whether the Maritime Commissioners were authorized
to commit the tort of retaining the shares after the principal debt had
been discharged, this would be inconsistent with the Court's attempt to
focus attention in all cases to an examination of the official's grant of
authority, whether he had exceeded it or merely made an. erroneous
interpretation, and whether as a matter of agency law the official's acts
were attributable to his principal. 27  In almost any case it would seem
that the plaintiff could show that there was no specific authority to
retain the tortiouslywithheld property.
28
The courts have not decided whether a tortious or wrongful with-
"Id. at 695."Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U. S. 536 (1926); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223
U. S. 605 (1912) ; United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 (1882).
"United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 (1882).
"Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 702 n. 26
(1949). The footnote states that the complaint in Land v. Dollar alleged that
any acquisition by the Commission which was not a mere pledge of collateral
would violate its statutory authority; therefore, the complaint alleged that the
defendants acted in excess of statutory authority.
"See note 16 supra.
28 See note 24 supra.
', Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 695 (1949).
"No court has explained the Dollar case as involving an unconstitutional
taking.
1955]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
holding would also be unconstitutional so as to allow jurisdiction
whether or not the officer's activities conflicted with the terms of his
grant of authority. A taking of property pursuant to an invalid grant
of authority may be enjoined;29 however, a grant of authority other-
wise valid would probably not be held unconstitutional merely because
it allows government officials tortiously to withhold property belonging
to private persons.30 In situations involving government property, recent
cases where the plaintiffs proceeded upon a theory of wrongful taking
or withholding of their property have not met with success ;31 for in-
stance, if plaintiff seeks an order compelling the defendant official to
release irrigation waters in which plaintiff has vested rights, relief
will be denied if it requires operation of federal dams and the release
of federally owned water impounded behind them.
32
Under the language employed by the Supreme Court in Domestic
& Foreign it seems certain that if allegations are made that the of-
ficer is withholding plaintiff's property without authority, or in such
a manner as to amount to an unconstitutional taking, if not frivolous,83
will entitle the plaintiff to affirmative relief if he proves the allegations,
even though he might also have an action for money damages under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.
4
3. Suits involving the sovereign's property. It was well established
that relief which sought to control the disposition of sovereign property
would usually be denied. This result was reached either on the theory
that the action was in effect one against the sovereign, or because the
United States would have to be joined as party defendant.3 5 However,
-2 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952)." Hudspeth County Conservation & Reclamation Dist. No. 1 v. Robbins,
213 F. 2d 425 (5th Cir. 1954).
"' Stack v. Strang, 94 F. Supp. 54 (S. D. N. Y. 1950), rev'd on other grounds
191 F. 2d 106 (2d Cir. 1951) (dispute over possession of gold coin of the United
States).
In Story v. Snyder, 184 F. 2d 454 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 866
(1950), plaintiff sued trustees of Library of Congress Trust Fund to recover
a sum for services due, contending that the defendants held his money as con-
structive trustees, citing Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731 (1947), as supporting
his claim for relief. The court rejected his contentions, pointing out that the
defendants in the Dollar litigation were torifeasors.
"Hudspeth County Conservation & Reclamation Dist. No. 1 v. Robbins, 213
F. 2d 425 (5th Cir. 1954).
" West Coast Exploration Co. v. McKay, 213 F. 2d 582 (D. C. Cir.), cert.
detied, 347 U. S. 988 (1954).
"For the magic effect of the allegation "unconstitutional" see Doehla Greet-
ing Cards, Inc. v. Summerfield, 116 F. Supp. 68 (D. C. 1953) (although officer
had authority to make an incorrect decision, plaintiff was entitled to his day
in court on basis of allegations that defendant acted arbitrarily and capriciously
so as to deprive plaintiff of property without due process of law).
" Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U. S. 371 (1945) (action
to compel official to cease withholding payments due held to be an action designed
to reach money owned by the United States); Maricopa County, Arizona v.
Valley Nat. Bank of Phoenix, 318 U. S. 357 (1943) (national bank stock in
possession of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation); Minnesota v. United
[Vol. 33
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if the plaintiff had acquired title to what had formerly been sovereign
property, federal officers could be restrained from wrongfully inter-
fering with plaintiff's property rights.36
Domestic & Foreign contains no language which could be construed
to relax the established rule where disposition of sovereign property is
sought;37 moreover, most recent decisions have reaffirmed that doc-
trine.2 8  However, in this connection West Coast Exploration Co. v.
McKay?9 should be noted. There the plaintiff owned certificates, called
"scrip" which gave the owner the right to select public lands for
entry. The Director of the Bureau of Land Management with the
concurrence of the Secretary of the Interior rejected plaintiff's appli-
cation for a certain location on the ground that the land sought was
mineral land, not subject to selection and entry by any "scrip" holder.
The relief sought was a decree compelling approval of plaintiff's appli-
cation and issuance of a patent to the land, based upon the defendant
Secretary of the Interior's alleged lack of authority in rejecting the
States, 305 U. S. 382 (1938) (attempt by state to condemn land held in trust
by the United States for Indians); New Mexico v. Lane, 243 U. S. 52 (1917)
(where dispute is over title to public lands, the United States is entitled to
be heard); United States ex rel. Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U. S. 218 (1913)
(bidder cannot compel delivery of surplus warship owned by the United States
Navy); Naganab v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 473 (1906) (action to restrain sale
by official of lands held by the United States in trust); Oregon v. Hitchcock,
202 U. S. 60 (1906) (action to restrain officials from alienating Indian lands);
Young v. Anderson, 160 F. 2d 225 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U. S. 824
(1947) (action to restrain official from leasing lands of the United States).
But a suit to restrain the Secretary of the Interior from placing the burden
upon the states to show that swamp lands are non-mineral in character in order
to acquire title is not a suit against the United States, even if the disposition
of sovereign property might ultimately be affected, where the Secretary acted
in excess of his authority. Work v. Louisiana, 269 U. S. 250 (1925).
"Ickes v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82 (1937) ; Lane v. Watts, 234 U. S. 525 (1913).
"7 Vinson, C. J., in the majority opinion stated, "In a suit against the officer
to recover damages for the agent's personal actions that question is easily
answered. The judgment sought will not require action by the sovereign or
disturb the sovereign's property." Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 687 (1949). "Of course, a suit may fail, as one against
the sovereign, even if it is claimed that the officer being sued has acted uncon-
stitutionally or beyond his statutory powers, if the relief requested cannot be
granted by merely ordering the cessation of the conduct complained of but will
require affirmative action by the sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably
sovereign property .... " Id. at 691 n. 11
8 New Haven Public Schools v. General Services Administration, 214 F. 2d
592 (7th Cir. 1954) (public land) ; New Mexico v. Backer, 199 F. 2d 426 (10th
Cir. 1952) (Bureau of Reclamation and Development dam) ; American Dredging
Co. v. Cochrane, 190 F. 2d 106 (D. C. Cir. 1951) (United States' barge) ; Stack
v. Strang, 94 F. Supp. 54 (S. D. N. Y. 1950), rezvd on other grounds, 191 F.
2d 106 (2d Cir. 1951) (gold coin of the United States). Accord: Seiden v.
Larson, 188 F. 2d 661 (D. C. Cir. 1951), overruled by West Coast Exploration
Co. v. McKay, 213 F. 2d 582 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U. S. 988 (1954)
insofar as it held that a suit could not be maintained against a federal officer
where government property was involved even if the official acted without
statutory authority.
so213 F. 2d 582 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U. S. 988 (1954).
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application and alleged clear duty to issue the patent. Even though
there was a dictum in Domestic & Foreign that there would be no
jurisdiction of an action against a federal official which would require
disposition of sovereign property despite claims that the officer acted
in excess of statutory authority, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia stated that it would be proper to entertain the action if
the Secretary had in fact acted without authority, and then proceeded
to the merits to the extent necessary to decide the question of author-
ity.41
4. Suits turning on the necessity of joining the United States as
party defendant. Some of the earlier cases turned on consideration of
the indispensability of or the necessity of naming the United States as
party defendant. 42  Of course if the United States must be joined this
cannot be done without its consent, and the whole action is dismissed.
This would seem to be merely a shorthand way of deciding whether the
original action is in fact one against the United States, but a dismissal
for failure to join a necessary or indispensable party is not technically
a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.4  The use of this technique often
"Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 691 n. 11
(1949). See note 37 supra. The Court of Appeals pointed out that a home-
steader or the locator of a mining claim satisfying requirements under the law
could be arbitrarily denied patents and have absolutely no recourse in the courts,
just because sovereign property was involved, if the dictum in the Domestic &
Foreign opinion were followed. West Coast Exploration Co. v. McKay, 213
F. 2d 582 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U. S. 988 (1954). Apparently the
court felt that the Supreme Court did not intend to preclude relief in the nature
of mandamus, where the plaintiff was otherwise entitled to it, solely because
government property was involved.
"' The court came to the conclusion that the Secretary of the Interior was
authorized to make the decision he made, and remanded the case with directions to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. West Coast Exploration Co. v. McKay, 213 F.
2d 582, 610 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U. S. 988 (1954). Other federal
courts have been more strict in allowing jurisdiction when government property
is involved. In New Haven Public Schools v. General Services Administration,
214 F. 2d 592 (7th Cir. 1954), plaintiff was seeking a decree compelling con-
veyance of public land, and he alleged that the official was acting wrongfully
in privately contracting to sell the land. The court readily affirmed a dis-
missal by the district court; however, in this case dismissal could have been
for failure to state a claim for relief. In Stack v. Strang, 94 F. Supp. 54
(S. D. N. Y. 1950), rev'd on other grounds, 191 F. 2d 106 (2d Cir. 1951), it
was claimed that the defendant Secret Service agent took a gold coin of the
United States from the plaintiff while acting wrongfully and without authority.
The action was dismissed. See Seiden v. Larson, note 38 supra.
"Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382 (1938) (proceeding against
property in which the United States has an interest) ; Wells v. Roper, 246 U. S.
335 (1918) (action to restrain Assistant Postmaster General from cancelling
mail carrying contract and from putting new plan into effect); United States
ex rel. Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U. S. 218 (1913) (bidder for surplus warship
sought to compel delivery of the craft by Navy Secretary) ; Young v. Ander-
son, 160 F. 2d 225 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U. S. 824 (1947) (action to
restrain Secretary of Agriculture from leasing government land). Cf. Goltra v.
Weeks, 271 U. S. 536 (1926) (United States not a necessary party in action
to enjoin Secretary of War from unauthorized seizure of plaintiff's barges).
"'Block, Suits Against Government Officers and The Sovereign Immunitv
Doctrine, 59 HARv. L. Rxv. 1060 (1946).
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avoids consideration of the basic questions whether the relief asked
would interfere with the administration of governmental affairs,' or
whether the acts complained of were in fact the acts of the sovereign
because the official was acting within the scope of his authority. Domes-
tic & Foreign does not attempt to alter this approach to the basic im-
munity question, but it is encouraging to note that recent cases have
met the issue of sovereign immunity squarely and have not approached
the issue from the standpoint of whether the United States is an in-
dispensable or necessary party.
45
5. Suits where official action is necessary to effectuate the relief
asked. Although the claim for relief is based upon allegations that
the official acted as an individual in injuring the plaintiff's legally pro-
tected interest, an issue which might affect the availability of relief
in every case is whether the relief sought would require action by
the defendant in his official capacity. Seemingly there would be very
strong reasons for refusing to entertain an action which seeks to con-
trol or direct the official activities of members of the executive branch,
4 6
but the courts have never refused relief on this ground alone; rather,
they seem to use this factor only as a make-weight.4 7 Indeed, any
" Cases recognizing the importance of the effects of the action upon govern-
mental affairs: Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113 (1940) (many suits
had frustrated the policies of the Public Contracts Act and had tied up its
administration for more than a year); Wells v. Roper, 246 U. S. 335 (1918)
(an intolerable interference with governmental processes to seek to compel
Assistant Postmaster General to retain old-fashioned methods of mail delivery);
Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U. S. 627 (1913) (suit would disturb the whole
revenue system and affect the revenue to be anticipated if defendant were or-
dered to revise tariff rates).
Two exceptions: Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States, 194 F. 2d 145 (D. C.
Cir. 1951); Jackson v. Sims, 201 F. 2d 259 (10th Cir. 1953).
The complaint may be dismissed for failure to name another official as de-
fendant. Snyder v. Buck, 340 U. S. 15 (1950) (successor in office not joined
in time); Cha-toine Hotel Apartments Building Corp. v. Shogren, 204 F. 2d
256 (7th Cir. 1953) (failure to join Federal Housing Administrator) ; Payne v.
Fite, 184 F. 2d 977 (5th Cir. 1950); N. Y. Technical Institute of Maryland,
Inc. v. Limburg, 87 F. Supp. 308 (D. Md. 1949). Cf. Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569 (D. C.), aff'd, 342 U. S. 820 (1952)
(President of United States not necessary or indispensable party when Com-
merce Secretary being sued for proceeding under invalid grant of authority).
"Wells v. Roper, 246 U. S. 335 (1918).
Codray v. Brownell, 207 F. 2d 610 (D. C. Cir. 1953), cert. denlied, 347 U. S.
903 (1954) (prayer that defendant be ordered to issue license authorizing pay-
ment of plaintiff's claim, or pay the plaintiff out of seized assets of alien cor-
poration; controlling reasons for denying relief: official discretion involved, and
failure to join Alien Property Custodian); American Dredging Co. v. Coch-
rane, 190 F. 2d 106 (D. C. Cir. 1951) (plaintiff sought to compel return of
surplus barge formerly owned by it; controlling reasons for dismissal: defendants
acting pursuant to authority, sovereign property involved, and no purely minis-
terial duty to deliver the barge to plaintiff); Payne v. Fite, 184 F. 2d 977
(5th Cir. 1950) (prayer that postmaster be ordered to deliver mail three times
daily instead of only once; controlling reasons for denying jurisdiction: official
discretion involved, failure to join Postmaster General). Cf. Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 (1951); United States ex rel.
Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U. S. 218 (1913).
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suit for specific relief against a government official wherein the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity might have application necessarily in-
volves the official capacity of the defendant. He is sued only because
he holds an office; the relief sought of necessity would restrain of-
ficial action or require affirmative official action.4 8 If the officer has
acted without authority or unconstitutionally the jurisdictional ques-
tion should not hinge upon whether an order rectifying damage done
to the plaintiff requires action or inaction in some official capacity. 49
If the jurisdiction of the courts depended upon whether the relief asked
would control official action, federal officials would be absolutely im-
mune from suit.50 The very fact that official activity can be directed
and controlled by court decree in itself shows that there is more fiction
than fact to the theory that there will be jurisdiction if the official
acted in an "individual" capacity rather than as an agent of the sover-
eign.
6. Suits against officials to compel payment of money due under
contract. The rule remains unchanged by Domestic & Foreign that
an action against an official which has as its object the payment of
money pursuant to the terms of a contract made with the defendant
in his official capacity, or which prays for money damages because of
breach of such a contract, cannot be maintained.5 ' The only course
In Sawyer v. Dollar, 190 F. 2d 623 (D. C. Cir. 1951) the Secretary of
Commerce had been ordered to indorse and return certain shares of stock to
the plaintiffs; the Secretary contended that he could not be required to act
in an official capacity, i.e., indorsing the stock as Secretary of Commerce. The
Court of Appeals held that since it had been decided that the defendant had
possession of the stock as an individual, he could be required by court decree
to yield whatever possession he had, with appropriate indorsements.
"'Plaintiffs proceeding against g'overment officials for affirmative relief
invariably substitute defendant's successor in office as party defendant, in case
of death or retirement. Substitution is governed by FFD. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
"In Doehla Greeting Cards, Inc. v. Summerfield, 116 F. Supp. 68 (D. C.
1953) the court states by way of footnote, "This court interprets the reference
in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., . . . to a 'suit for specific
relief against the officer as an individual' to mean a suit against the individual
officer in his official capacity where necessary to effect the relief sought, as dis-
tinguished from a suit against the officer which is in effect a suit against the
United States." Id. at 76n.
"That they should not be so immune: West Coast Exploration Co. v. McKay,
213 F. 2d 582, 596 (D. C. Cir. 1954), and Sawyer v. Dollar, 190 F. 2d 623
(D. C. Cir. 1951).
6 Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U. S. 371 (1945) , Nimro v.
Davis, 204 F. 2d 734 (D. C. Cir. 1953); Burkley v. United States, 185 F. 2d
267 (7th Cir. 1950); Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. MacArthur Mining Co.,
Inc., 184 F. 2d 913 (8th Cir. 1950).
There is no jurisdiction to entertain such actions even under the theory of
Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731 (1947), to the effect that the plaintiff owns the
money and the defendants wrongfully withhold it from him. Story v. Snyder, 184
F. 2d 454 (D. C. Cir. 1950) (plaintiff contended that defendants held the money
in trust for him).
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open to the complaining party is to proceed against the United States
for damages in the district courts or in the Court of Claims.52
7. Suits to compel performance of purely ministerial duties. The
Domestic & Foreign opinion also leaves substantially unchanged the
availability of relief in the nature of mandamus against an officer to
compel performance of a clear legal duty.53  It had never been held
that an action to compel the performance of a purely ministerial duty
is in effect a suit against the United States or one requiring the joinder
of the United States as a party defendant.5 4  On the other hand, if
the action is to compel performance of an official duty which involves
the exercise of discretion it is a suit against the United States if that
exercise is pursuant to the terms of a grant of authority.55 If the
question of clear legal duty turns on the authority of the defendant
to refuse to release the property the plaintiff is seeking, then the
Domestic & Foreign rule that the defendant's acts must conflict with
the terms of the grant of authority comes into play.56 This illustrates
the close interrelationship and interplay of established rules in every
suit against federal officers.
Although many actions against federal officers might be disposed of
on non-jurisdictional grounds such as failure to exhaust available reme-
dies before seeking equitable relief, 57 it is desirable that the jurisdic-
-Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States, 194 F. 2d 145 (D. C. Cir. 1951);
see note 4 supra.
"' Chapman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 204 F. 2d 46 (D. C. Cir. 1953).
Although FE. R. Civ. P. 81(b) abolishes the writ of mandamus, the remedy
itself is still available and may be obtained by appropriate action or motion.
Hammond v. Hull, 131 F. 2d 23 (D. C. Cir. 1942). The general principles
governing its use are: (1) the duty should be clearly defined and the obligation
to act peremptory; (2) the party seeking relief must show that defendant has
breached his duty; (3) the courts have no general supervisory power over
the executive branch; (4) if the defendant's duty requires an interpretation of
the law governing that duty, it will not be interfered with absent arbitrariness
or capriciousness on the part of the official; (5) generally, the party seeking
this relief must exhaust any administrative remedies available. Hammond v.
Hull, 131 F. 2d 23 (D. C. Cir. 1942).
'Miguel v. McCarl, 291 U. S. 442 (1934); Houston v. Ormes, 252 U. S.
469 (1920); Smith v. Jackson, 246 U. S. 388 (1918).
'Wells v. Roper, 246 U. S. 335 (1918).
"West Coast Exploration Co. v. McKay, 213 F. 2d 582 (D. C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 347 U. S. 988 (1954) ; Codray v. Brownell, 207 F. 2d 610 (D. C. Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 347 U. S. 903 (1954); American Dredging Co. v. Cochrane,
190 F. 2d 106 (D. C. Cir. 1951).
" Franklin v. Jonco Aircraft Corp., 346 U. S. 86 (1953); Rogers v. Skin-
ner, 201 F. 2d 521 (5th Cir. 1953). One district court has stated that if the
threat of irreparable injury is serious or if the officer is allegedly acting without
authority or unconstitutionally, other remedies need not be exhausted. Parker v.
Lester, 98 F. Supp. 300, 307 (N. D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 191 F. 2d 1020
(9th Cir. 1951); Farrell v. Moomau, 85 F. Supp. 125, 127 (N. D. Cal. 1949).
Cases which could have been disposed of on the ground that plaintiff had
suffered no injury to a legally protected interest: New Haven Public Schools v.
General Services Administration, 214 F. 2d 592 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Guiberson v.
Reconstruction Finance Corp., 196 F. 2d 154 (5th Cir. 1952). In some cases
this was the reason for dismissal. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113
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tional question be decided when raised. Because of the uncertainty
of the application of the immunity doctrine, to decide the issue of juris-
diction first would avoid prolonging the litigation in a substantial num-
ber of cases.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity with all of its subtleties is one
which frequently confronts the federal courts. It has been suggested
that a test avoiding all fictions should be adopted, that only those suits
should be dismissed which would unduly interfere with government
operations.5 s This measure of jurisdiction would certainly be more
in keeping with the fundamental nature of a form of government which
derives its authority and power from consent of the governed; however,
such a test is not without shortcomings. If adopted it would place
upon the courts the heavy burden of predicting the effect of each action
upon the operations of the governmental machinery involved, and the
necessity of weighing that effect against the interests of the plaintiff
and all persons similarly situated.
There is little, if any, likelihood of Congressional action on this
subject; therefore, future cases will in all probability continue the same
pattern of case by case adjudication and application of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity to the peculiar facts of the litigation before the
court.
R. G. HALL, JR.
Insurance-Recovery under Windstorm Clauses
As a result of the recent hurricane which struck North Carolina,
many problems will arise as to what damages are recoverable under
windstorm clauses of insurance policies. This note is an attempt to
set forth some of the rules of law applicable to windstorm clauses.
The extended coverage endorsement generally in use in North
Carolina covers direct loss by windstorm. Expressly excepted are
all losses caused directly or indirectly by water, whether driven by
wind or not, unless the water entered the building through an opening
made by wind. Damage to seawalls, docks, piers, boathouses, cabanas,
and bulkheads is also excepted.'
(1940); Royal Sundries Corp. v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 136 (E. D. N. Y.
1953).
"Advocated in Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovcreigis
Immunity Doctrine, 59 HAV. L. REv. 1060 (1946).
'An example of the usual extended coverage endorsement approved by the
North Carolina Fire Insurance Rating Bureau is: "EXTENDED COVERAGE:
In consideration of the premium for this coverage shown on the first page of
this policy, and subject to provisions and stipulations (hereinafter referred to
as 'provisions') herein and in the policy to which this endorsement is attached
including riders and endorsements thereon, the coverage of this policy is extended
to include direct loss by Windstorm, Hail. ...
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